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Abstract
This paper analyzes the effect of statutory tax rates on the location of Japanese capital
in emerging countries. Considering the fact that the difference between Japan and foreign
tax rates can engender transfer pricing manipulation to diminish tax liabilities, and that
some firms are more able to manipulate transfer pricing, such as wholly-owned ventures
and high technology affiliates, we investigate the sensitivity of Japanese capital to foreign
tax rates by distinguishing wholly-owned ventures from joint-ventures and high R&D
affiliates from low R&D affiliates. Based on country, parent firm and sector characteristics
an investment equation is estimated on a sample of 3774 Japanese affiliates in 49 emerging
countries. We obtain a greater semi-elasticity between investment and the statutory tax
rate for wholly-owned affiliates and R&D intensive parents. We interpret these results as
indirect evidence for abusive transfer pricing to be one of the determinants of FDI flows.
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1 Introduction
Cross-country differences in corporate income tax rates may lead multinationals to find strate-
gies in order to diminish the cost of their tax liabilities. Transfer pricing activities represent
a common way to minimize the fiscal burden. Some empirical studies, such as Jenkins and
Wright (1975), Grubert and Mutti (1991) or Hines and Rice (1994) show that multinational
corporations take advantage of tax planning opportunities by shifting income from high tax
countries to low tax countries. The widespread use of transfer pricing strategies is probably one
of the main reasons why investments coming from tax credit countries are highly sensitive to
low foreign tax rates. Indeed, home-host country tax differentials affect investors directly -when
dividends are repatriated after some time, or in the case of a bilateral tax sparing agreement-
and indirectly, by providing them with the opportunity to shift taxable income to low tax
countries through transfer pricing.
Transfer pricing is a common activity, characterized by the prices used for internal sales of
goods, services and technology between related parties. This activity is regular when prices are
established at arm’s length standard and becomes abusive when prices are conducted above or
under market prices. Empirical research on transfer pricing abuse has focused mainly on firms
established in developed countries, but has overlooked emerging countries, which are considered
to be more vulnerable to transfer pricing manipulations. Two decades ago, papers by Brean
(1979) and Plasschaert (1985) indicated that developing countries were the target of transfer
pricing abuses because of the weaknesses of institutions, and the difficulty to implement a legal
and regulatory framework for transfer pricing. However, the number of emerging countries
interested in transfer pricing practices has considerably increased the last decade, generating
the adoption of a transfer pricing legislation with penalty rules (Ernst & Young “Transfer
pricing 2003 global survey”). This new attention from both emerging country policy and tax
audit perspectives lends importance to this tax issue.
Furthermore, transfer pricing manipulation can be easier for certain types of companies,
depending on their firm specific characteristics. For instance, the literature suggests that this
manipulation can be greater when the capital is totally controlled by the parent firm, as the
decision to shift profit is taken unilaterally and thus not limited by the divergent interests of
a partner (Kant, 1990; Desai et al., 2004) and when the firm is intensive in technology, as the
market price of a specialized product is more difficult to establish (Lall, 1979). If multinational
corporations integrate transfer pricing manipulations in their investment decisions, wholly-
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owned ventures and high technology affiliates should be more sensitive to the level of foreign
taxes as they are more able to benefit from tax differentials.
The objective of this paper is to address these issues, first by assessing the responsiveness to
taxes of the capital invested in wholly-owned ventures and joint-ventures; second, by analyzing
the sensitivity to taxes of the capital invested in high R&D affiliates and low R&D affiliates.
The empirical analysis is based on Japanese firm level data for the year 2001 and focuses on
49 ‘emerging countries’1. This analysis also takes in consideration tax sparing provisions, that
developed countries usually agree on with emerging countries only, and which may have an
impact on the sensitivity of capital to tax rates.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section a literature review of the impact of
taxation on the mode of location of FDI is presented. Secondly, a conceptual framework of
credit investor responsiveness to taxes in emerging countries is proposed. Section 3 empirically
analyses the effect of taxes on the amount of Japanese capital invested abroad by distinguishing
the mode of establishment of the affiliate and by considering the R&D intensity of the affiliate.
Section 4 offers concluding remarks.
2 Literature Review of the Impact of Taxation on the
Mode of Location of FDI
A multinational corporation can produce a commodity abroad by establishing a wholly-owned
venture, whose capital is 100% held, or by forming a joint-venture with another firm. Transfer
pricing represents for both establishments a non-negligible way to maximize their after tax rate
of return. However, the conflicting interests of partners in joint-venture entities can diminish
the incentives to shift profits away, so that joint-ventures may be less sensitive than majority-
owned firms to international taxation. Svejnar and Smith (1984) theoretically investigate the
transfer pricing behavior of joint-ventures established in less developed countries. Using a
game-theoretic approach, their results imply that in maximizing their joint profit, the partners
of the joint-venture entity also try to minimize the tax liabilities in emerging host countries
by adjusting transfer pricing. If, as demonstrated by Svejnar and Smith (1984), a relationship
1Our sample contains countries whose financial markets are commonly described as ’emerging’. Almost all
could be considered ’developing’ countries according to the operational classification of the World Bank, i.e.
countries with gross national income below $10,065. We refer to them as ’emerging countries’ throughout the
paper.
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between joint-ventures and transfer pricing can be established, as suggested by Kant (1990),
who models the government revenue effect of transfer pricing abuses by minority-owned firms,
the strategic use of transfer pricing by joint-ventures to avoid taxes is however limited by the
conflict of interest that can arise between the partners. In addition, there are a few studies
which explicitly demonstrate that foreign direct investment in wholly-owned establishments is
more sensitive to tax rates than investment in joint-venture establishments.
Indeed, Desai et al. (2004), examine the determinants of partial ownership of U.S foreign
affiliates from 1982 to 1997. By distinguishing wholly-owned, majority-owned and minority-
owned firms, they analyze, among other investigations, the influence of tax policies in host
countries on the desirability of forming joint ventures or wholly owned ventures. Their results
suggest that tax rate differentials between the U.S and the host countries increase the likelihood
of a firm of establishing wholly-owned ventures. Indeed, in the presence of tax rate differences
the likelihood of establishing a wholly-owned firm is 2.38 times higher than the likelihood of
establishing a partial ownership. These findings give credence to the conception that multi-
nationals with tax planning opportunities are more likely to establish their foreign affiliates
as wholly-owned entities. Two other important results strengthen this relationship. Firstly,
affiliates with a higher ratio of related party sales to the affiliate’s total sales, are more likely to
be wholly owned. Secondly, when net incomes of partially-owned affiliates and wholly-owned
affiliates are considered separately, it is found that net incomes of wholly-owned affiliates are
significantly more sensitive to foreign tax rates than are net incomes of partially-owned affiliates.
Thus larger trade between wholly-owned affiliates and related parties and greater sensitivity of
their net income to the level of foreign taxes suggest that they are more able to practice tax
planning, compared to joint-venture affiliates.
Swenson (2001) investigates the tax responsiveness of FDI in the U.S between 1984 and
1994 across 6 different forms of FDI: new plants, plant expansions, merger and acquisitions,
joint ventures, equity increases and other. The data refer to 3,212 investment projects, in
the manufacturing sector, realized by investors coming from 46 countries across 50 states. Her
results indicate that plant creation, plant expansion and equity increase decisions are negatively
and significantly correlated with the level of U.S tax rates for investors coming from tax credit
system countries, with an elasticity of −5.65, −4.98 and −8.59 respectively. In contrast, joint
venture decisions appear not to be influenced by taxation as the coefficient is not significant.
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Desai and Hines (1999), in examining the effect of the U.S Tax Reform Act of 19862 on
joint venture participation by U.S multinational firms, find a difference in the sensitivity of
U.S investment depending on the mode of establishment of the entities. They estimate the
impact of local taxation on the difference between growth rates of equity of joint ventures and
majority-owned affiliates between 1982 and 1989, and find that a 1% decrease in the tax rate
is linked with 10.4% slower growth of joint ventures relative to majority owned ventures.
The observation that wholly-owned establishments are more responsive to the level of foreign
taxes seems to be clearly established by these empirical studies. However no one has carried
out this demonstration in emerging countries, where the existence of special tax provisions can
modify the sensitivity of FDI to taxes. In addition, systematic differences in the tax sensitivity
of investments in high- and low-technology affiliates have never been investigated. The next
section offers a simple theoretical framework, in which we show how the incidence of statutory
tax rates on foreign investment depends on the mode of establishment (joint-venture versus
wholly-owned venture) and R&D-intensity.
3 A Conceptual Framework for Credit Investor Respon-
siveness to Taxes in Emerging Countries
The Japanese corporate tax system is a credit tax system. Japanese fiscal authorities tax
worldwide income at the domestic rate, while investors may claim foreign tax credits for any
taxes paid abroad, to avoid double taxation. This system is meant to offset the effect of
host-country taxation on Japanese investment behavior, and tax revenues. Indeed, as long as
host countries’ tax rate is lower than Japan’s (‘insufficient tax credit case’), the location of
investment should be insensitive to local taxation.
However, three factors may restore the influence of lower foreign tax rates on investment
allocation: the deferred distribution of foreign dividends, the manipulation of transfer prices,
and the existence of tax sparing provisions in bilateral fiscal treaties. Deferred distribution
may be profitable as re-invested foreign profits should capitalize at a higher rate than home
profits, leading to a greater repatriated dividend. The manipulation of transfer prices should
enhance this possibility, by allowing to shift taxable income from an affiliate located in a high-
2The Tax Reform Act of 1986 contains new tax provisions, such as removing worldwide averaging by creating
a separate basket for dividends received by foreign corporations owned between 10% and 50% by Americans,
which increase the tax cost of joint venture firms.
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tax country to an affiliate located in a low-tax country. Finally, tax sparing provisions should be
favorable to these tax planning opportunities, allowing investors to benefit from tax incentives
that lower local tax rates even further.
In this section, we develop a simple theoretical framework to understand tax planning
opportunities in the context of Japanese investment overseas. In our model, a parent company
will be able to defer the distribution of foreign profits and choose the profit-maximizing transfer
price, at which it exports a product to its foreign subsidiary.
Consider the case of a firm headquartered in country h, where a tax credit system applies,
that owns a subsidiary in country f . We assume throughout that , tf ≤ th, where tf is the
statutory tax rate in the foreign country and th is the statutory tax rate in the home country
3.
Assume that in each country i, an upfront investment of ki yields a gross profit of Πi per unit
of time, before taxation, with:
Πh(p) = Rh(sh)− Ch(sh +m) + pm (1)
Πf (p) = Rf (sf )− Cf (sf −m)− p(1 + τ)m (2)
where m is the volume of intra-firm trade flowing from country h to country f , p is the transfer
price, τ is the tariff rate between the two countries, Ri(·) and Ci(·), the revenue and cost
functions in country i, and si the level of sales in country i.
It is possible to compute the rate of return of each type of investment (at home and abroad),
before taxation:
ri(p) =
Πi(p)− ki
ki
, i = h, f
so that, by construction,
ki(1 + ri(p)) = Πi(p), i = h, f
Consider now an investment horizon of n periods. After-tax capitalized profits from each
type of investment, distributed as a cash dividend, may be written as4:
3We focus on this situation as only one emerging country has a statutory tax rate higher than the Japanese
one in our sample.
4These capitalized profits represent the gains after n periods, net of the initial investment (the principal). In
theory, the principal may always be recovered by liquidating the subsidiary, while the liquidation value should
not be subject to income taxation. Therefore, this value should not affect our calculations.
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Di(p) = ki (1 + ri(p)(1− ti))n − ki, i = h, f
or, rearranging,
Di(p) = ki
j=n∑
j=1
[
ri(p)(1− ti) (1 + ri(p)(1− ti))j−1
]
, i = h, f.
We start with the case where no manipulation of transfer prices occurs. Intra-firm sales
are denominated at the market price pˆ, which we assume is known to tax authorities. Given
that the MNC is investing both at home and abroad, and that it originates from a tax credit
system, it must hold that the pre-tax rates of return be the same, i.e. rh(pˆ) = rf (pˆ) ≡ r.
However, as tax rates will differ across locations, and as a dividend may be taxed only after
distribution, post-tax returns will differ if the MNC defers the distribution of foreign profits.
Indeed, before distribution, dividends could be re-invested at a rate of return higher than the
home rate, simply because of tax differentials.
To see this, let us compare foreign profits in the case where dividends are immediately
repatriated and re-invested in home operations, and the case where they are re-invested in
foreign operations during n periods. In the case of immediate distribution (ID), at time j = 1,
profits from foreign operations are taxed at tf , but home tax authorities offer adequate tax
credits, while they tax this income at rate th. Afterwards, this income is re-invested in the
home venture, with profits capitalizing at the rate r(1− th). Hence:
DIDf (pˆ) = kf
[
rf (pˆ)(1− th)
j=n∑
j=1
(1 + rh(pˆ)(1− th))j−1
]
= Dh(pˆ) (3)
By contrast, in the case of deferred distribution (DD), profits from foreign operations are
taxed at tf at all times, while only the dividend after n periods is taxed at th through the tax
credit mechanism. Hence:
DDDf (pˆ) = kf
[
rf (pˆ)(1− tf )
j=n∑
j=1
(
[1 + rf (pˆ)(1− tf )]j−1
)
− rf (pˆ)(th − tf )
j=n∑
j=1
(
[1 + rf (pˆ)(1− tf )]j−1
)]
or put simply
DDDf (pˆ) = kf
[
rf (pˆ)(1− th)
j=n∑
j=1
(1 + rf (pˆ)(1− tf ))j−1
]
(4)
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Given that pre-tax rate of returns rh and rf are identical, comparisons of the second equa-
tion with the ID case is obvious. In Equations (3) and (4), the factor term can be understood
as a post-tax rate of return at time of repatriation, while the sum represents the capitalized
post-tax rate of return from re-investment. The latter term is simply larger under deferred
distribution, all the more as tax differentials are high, hence greater dividends with deferred
repatriation. This restores a role for local taxation in influencing the location of investments
by firms originating from tax credit countries, such as Japan.
Differences between home and foreign country tax rates also allow multinational firms to
reduce their tax liabilities by manipulating transfer prices (Grubert and Mutti, 1991). Under-
invoicing exports from the firm established in the high tax country (be it the parent company
or an affiliate in another country) to the firm established in the low tax country enables MNCs
to shift taxable income in a profitable way. In our framework, this amounts to choose a transfer
price p lower than the acknowledged market value pˆ5. This manipulation increases the return
on foreign investment relative to that of investment at home, increasing the amount of profit re-
invested in the low-tax country. This eventually reducesDh, but increasesD
DD
f by more because
of capitalization at a higher rate. Therefore the global after tax profit of the multinational
increases.
Indeed, it is easily seen from Equation (1) that Πh(p) is an increasing function. Similarly,
it is easily seen from Equation (2) that Πf (p) is a decreasing function. Therefore a decrease in
p must reduce the return on home investment, and increase the return on foreign investment.
As the post-tax return is the product of the pre-tax return and (one minus) the tax rate, the
home-foreign difference in post-tax returns must be even greater. Hence a greater incentive to
defer distribution, and a greater sensitivity to local rates in the first place.
However, transfer pricing deviations from arm’s length standards are prohibited by tax au-
thorities, as they would amount to tax evasion. As suggested by Ernst & Young’s “Transfer
pricing 2003 global survey”, transactions whose price substantially differs from the estimated
market price are typically fined by tax authorities. Following Kant (1990), we introduce penal-
ties in our framework by assuming that tax authorities may spot such manipulations with
probability µ(|p− pˆ|), where µ(·) is an increasing function and pˆ denotes the estimated market
price. Denoting the applicable fine by F , we are left with the following objective function (net
5Indeed Πh would be reduced, compared to a transaction at market price, because of exports at a price lower
than the market price; Πf would be increased as the subsidiary’s imports would become cheaper.
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expected profits) for the multinational:
V (p) = Dh(p) + αD
DD
f (p)− αµ(|p− pˆ|)F (5)
where α ∈ [0, 1] denotes the share of the subsidiary’s capital owned by the MNC. Therefore,
the economic incentive to manipulate transfer prices, when tax rate differentials matter, should
be traded-off against the expected loss from the penalty. In what follows, we assume concavity
of the objective function V (·)6. Therefore a unique profit-maximizing transfer price exists,
implicitly defined by:
dV (p)
dp
=
dDh(p)
dp
+ α
dDDDf (p)
dp
− αµ′(|p− pˆ|)F = 0 (6)
As discussed above, the first derivative should be positive, while the second and the third
terms should be negative.
The transfer price solving this equation will not have a general analytical formulation, but
rather depend on cost and revenue functions, through the return functions. However, it is
possible to perform some simple comparative statics and extensions of the model to investigate
the influence of ownership shares, tax sparing provisions and R&D intensity on tax planning
behavior.
3.1 Joint-venture versus Wholly-owned ventures
In principle, investment in wholly-owned affiliates and joint-ventures from a credit country may
be affected in different ways by the level of taxation.
It can be shown, using (6), that a larger ownership share of the affiliate translates into a
higher incentive to manipulate transfer prices. Consider under-invoicing as a move dp < 0 from
the arms’ length transfer price towards the optimal price. As argued above, dDDDf (p) must be
positive, while dDh(p) is negative and the term involving the penalty must be negative. Then,
for a negative dp, we obtain dDDDf (p) > µ
′(|p − pˆ|)F , when evaluated at the optimal transfer
price. But the cross-derivative of V with respect to V and α is equal to:
∂2V (p)
∂p∂α
=
dDDDf (p)
dp
− µ′(|p− pˆ|) (7)
which is negative. This means that for a negative dp, under-invoicing is all the more prof-
6A sufficient condition for this is that concavity of the gross profit function and convexity of µ(·) jointly hold.
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itable as α rises. This comes from the fact that at an optimally abusive transfer price, the gain
from inflating the foreign profit by an infinitesimal amount is still higher than the rise in the
penalty. Therefore, the higher the ownership share, the greater the incentive to manipulate
transfer prices7.
Note that another mechanism put forward by the literature is the existence of diverging
interests between MNCs and local partners over the choice of the transfer price (Lecraw, 1985;
Kant, 1990; Emmanuel and Mehafdi, 1994). Indeed, the parent company would benefit from
transfer pricing alone, while partners could share the risk of being fined, and diverge on their
appreciation of the optimal transfer price. Our framework does not take into account the costs of
negotiating an agreement over transfer prices between partners. However, a local partner solely
concerned with minimizing the expected loss from a sanction would choose p = pˆ, irrespective
of her share in the venture.
This yields a testable prediction. We should observe that wholly-owned ventures are more
able to manipulate transfer pricing. Therefore they should be more sensitive to tax rate levels,
compared to joint-venture affiliates.
3.2 Technology Intensity
There is some evidence of differential treatment of foreign investors by host-country tax au-
thorities according to their technological level. First, a number of countries may be particularly
interested in attracting high R&D multinational firms, offering them relatively more generous
fiscal incentives than to low R&D affiliates (PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2000 edition of the ’Doing
Business and Investment Series’). Second, this desire to attract technological investments can
be such a priority in emerging countries that tax authorities can voluntarily avoid to audit high
technology affiliates, for fear of losing them to another country. Indeed, Chan and Chow (1997)
have investigated the implementation of international transfer pricing legislation by Chinese tax
authorities, using 81 cases on tax audits performed in 1992 and 1993 on foreign investments.
They find that some categories of multinationals were never audited, namely high-technology
and larger multinationals. Finally, as suggested by Lall (1979), high technology multinationals
have a greater propensity to manipulate transfer pricing since the market price of very special-
ized products is difficult to establish. This difficulty is more pronounced for emerging countries
7Implicitly, we assumed that the penalty was paid by the parent company in proportion to its investment.
This explains why the derivative with respect to the ownership share depends on the expected fine. Note that in
the case of a fixed penalty scheme, the derivative would still be negative: we would still predict abusive transfer
pricing to be likelier in wholly- rather than partly-owned affiliates.
10
as they suffer from “the lack of institutional framework and the inadequacy of expertise and
resources to tackle this issue” (Chan and Chow, 1997, p 84).
It is therefore reasonable to expect systematic differences in transfer pricing abuses according
to the technological level of products. More precisely, we hypothesize that investment in high
technology affiliates is more sensitive to foreign tax rates than in low technology affiliates.
Turning back to our theoretical framework, we assume systematic differences in the expected
loss from a sanction, according to the degree of R&D expenditure. This lower expected loss
may come either from a lower probability of detection or enforcement, µ, for a given offense, or
from more leniency in the form of a lower fine (potentially nil).
It is straightforwardly seen from (6) that a decrease in µ(·) or a decrease in F imply a
higher deviation from the market price. In a R&D-intensive sector, we therefore expect a
higher sensitivity of investment to tax levels, all else equal.
Furthermore, we may give a prediction on the interaction between the degree of R&D and
ownership shares.
dV (p)
dp
=
dDh(p)
dp
+ α
dDDDf (p)
dp
− αµ′(|p− pˆ|;E)F = 0 (8)
where E stands for the level of R&D expenditure, with ∂
2µ
∂|p−pˆ|∂E < 0. Since that the deviation
from the market price is the image of dDh(p)
dp
+ α
dDDDf (p)
dp
by the inverse of µ′(·), and that µ(·) is
increasing in its first argument, we expect that higher R&D levels and whole ownership should
together increase investors’ responsiveness to tax levels.
3.3 Tax sparing provisions
Emerging countries routinely offer tax incentives to foreign investors, for a number of reasons.
In principle, the tax credit system, without deferral, should cancel out the effect of these
incentives. However, even in the absence of deferral, the home government may protect the
benefit of tax incentives offered by host governments through the signature of a tax sparing
provision. Indeed, tax sparing provisions allow for the calculation of the foreign tax credit
on the statutory tax rate, while tax incentives make a reduced rate apply on the actual tax
liabilities. Under these provisions, multinationals simply pocket the difference8. Tax sparing
8A numerical example can be given. Consider in a first time a situation without tax incentives. The profit
of a foreign affiliate in an emerging country is 100$. The corporate income tax is 20% in the host country and
30% in the home country. Firms are allowed to claim a credit to the home country for the foreign taxes paid.
Thus they pay 20$ to the host country and 30-20= 10$ to the home country. In a second time, a fiscal incentive
11
provisions have been found to be empirically relevant for the location and magnitude of FDI in
some studies, in particular in the case of Japanese firms by Aze´mar et al. (2006).
It is interesting to investigate the effect of tax sparing provisions on FDI in the presence of
deferred distribution of earnings. Let us introduce a reduced rate t′f in our framework, with
t′f < tf . The difference between the statutory and the reduced rate, tf − t′f is passed onto the
investor in the form of reduced tax liabilities in the home country.
We may rewrite Equations (4) and (5) in order to account for the existence of tax sparing
(TS) provisions:
V TS(p) = Dh(p) + αD
DD
f,TS(p)− αµ(|p− pˆ|)F (9)
where
DDDf,TS(p) = kf
[
rf (p)(1− t′f )
j=n∑
j=1
([
1 + rf (pˆ)(1− t′f )
]j−1)− rf (p)(th − tf ) j=n∑
j=1
([
1 + rf (pˆ)(1− t′f )
]j−1)]
or put simply
DDDf,TS(p) = kf
[
rf (p)(1− th + tf − t′f )
j=n∑
j=1
([
1 + rf (pˆ)(1− t′f )
]j−1)]
It is clearly seen that, all else equal, dividends repatriated from TS countries must be
relatively higher. Local profits are capitalized at a preferential rate, but this may happen in a
country offering incentives but without TS provisions. However, in a country having signed TS
provisions, repatriated profits are taxed at a lower rate because of the artificially high credit.
Besides, the profits from home operations are not affected. We conclude that TS provisions
should increase the incentives to raise foreign returns by manipulating transfer prices.
In the analogue of (6), the effect of a change in the transfer price has a larger effect on
DDDf,TS(p) than D
DD
f (p), all else equal. In addition, the cross-derivative of V with respect to p
and α should also be of a greater magnitude.
Hence we expect that, in countries that have signed tax sparing provisions with Japan,
investors should be sensitive to the difference between the statutory rate and reduced rate,
compared to other countries. In these TS countries, the manipulation of transfer prices should
be less likely with partial rather than whole ownership, and with low rather than high R&D
is grant by the host country and firms do not have to pay the 20% tax rate. Without tax sparing firms have to
pay 30$ to the home country as they do not pay foreign taxes. With tax sparing, the 20% foreign corporate tax
rate is deemed to have been paid and thus become creditable; so in that case firms pay 0$ to the host country
and 30-20=10$ to the home country.
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expenditure. However, these marginal effects of ownership and R&D expenditure should be less
pronounced than in countries without TS provisions, because of the importance of differentials
to both types of affiliates in TS countries.
Finally, we may give a prediction on the triple interaction between ownership shares, the
degree of R&D, and the existence of tax sparing provisions. The presence of TS agreements
should again reduce the magnitude of the difference in sensitivity between the coefficients of
wholly-owned affiliates and joint-ventures, and between high and low R&D ventures. There-
fore we should expect higher R&D intensity and whole ownership to have a smaller effect on
investors’ responsiveness to tax levels with TS than without.
We are now ready to apply this line of reasoning to the analysis of the determinants of
Japanese FDI.
4 Empirical Test: Japanese Capital Sensitivity to Taxes
in Emerging Countries
4.1 Data and Estimation
We test the influence of taxation on the international strategies of Japanese multinational
enterprises in emerging countries. Our data on Japanese foreign investment flows at the affiliate
level come from the 2001 annual edition of Kaigai Shinshutsu Kigyou Souran - Kuni Betsu
(Japanese Overseas Investments - by country). These data are compiled by Toyo Keizai, a
large statistical publisher in Japan, as part of its annual survey of the overseas investment
activities of Japanese firms. The database offers exhaustive information of the level of capital
invested in a country “i” by each Japanese subsidiary operating abroad in 2001. For each
plant of the sample, affiliate- and parent-specific data are available. When the affiliate is a
joint-venture firm, with two or more parents, the parent firm which possesses the larger share
of the affiliate is considered.
Only emerging countries are considered in this analysis. Due to missing macro-economic
data for several emerging countries, the set of countries is substantially shortened to finally
focus on Japanese investments in 49 countries. Table 1 summarizes the number of Japanese
establishments and the total amount of capital invested in each emerging country of the sample.
Not surprisingly, China is the major recipient of Japanese capital with more than 13 billion
USD in 2001. Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia, Brazil and South Korea also represent attractive
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Table 1: Japanese number of entities and capital invested in emerging countries in 2001
Country Nbr of entities Capital Inv. Country Nbr of entities Capital Inv.
Argentina 19 302 Mexico 110 591
Bahrain 3 17.2 Morocco 1 0.24
Bangladesh 2 0.91 Nigeria 10 0.23
Bolivia 1 0.48 Oman 1 0.39
Brazil 156 1650 Panama 54 179
Cameroon 2 0.01 Papua N.G 1 4.20
Chile 31 302 Paraguay 2 31.2
China 1122 13300 Peru 14 38.3
Colombia 12 6.83 Philippines 207 1140
Costa Rica 1 2.79 Poland 32 87.2
Czech Rep. 25 178 Romania 4 0.65
Ecuador 7 9.99 Russia 15 64.8
Egypt 3 20.1 Saudi Ar. 8 89.1
El Salvador 3 24.6 Slovak Rep. 3 0.59
Ethiopia 2 0.44 South Africa 17 17.1
Ghana 1 0.96 Sri Lanka 7 24.5
Guatemala 2 0.59 Tanzania 2 0.25
Honduras 1 0.01 Thailand 665 4680
Hungary 22 255 Trinidad and T. 2 1.22
India 87 1300 Turkey 9 46.1
Indonesia 356 3210 Ukraine 4 2.01
Iran 13 8.24 Venezuela 16 276
Kenya 1 0.03 Vietnam 83 615
Korea 216 1480 Zambia 1 0.12
Malaysia 418 2780
Notes: The capital invested is in million of USD. The countries in bold are those with whom
Japan has a tax sparing provision included in bilateral tax treaties.
locations for Japanese investment which level of capital is respectively, 4680, 3210, 2780, 1650
and 1480 million of USD. At the opposite end, African countries such as Cameroon, Kenya,
Nigeria, Zambia and Morocco are those in which Japanese firms invest the less.
In this paper, two modes of establishments of 3774 Japanese affiliates are distinguished:
the wholly-owned venture and the joint-venture. The wholly-owned ventures, which are 100
percent owned by a Japanese parent, represent 1373 establishments in the sample of countries
analyzed i.e 36.4% of the total number of affiliates. The joint-ventures, which are owned by
Japanese parents with a minimum of 10 percent, represent 2401 entities i.e 63.6% of the total
number of affiliates.
The model to be estimated is of the form:
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CAPaphs = f(Hh, Pp, Aa, Ds, STRh) + εaph (10)
The dependent variable, the affiliate-level flow of Japanese capital, “CAPaphs”, is regressed
against a set of standard determinants specific to the host country Hh, to the parent firm Pp,
to the affiliate Aa, to the sector Ds and to the host country’s statutory tax rate STRh; εaph
is the error term. The natural logarithms of the variables have been taken (except for the tax
variable). This has two advantages: such a transformation reduces the influence of large values
and allows the coefficients to be interpreted as ordinary elasticities. The coefficient before the
statutory tax rate will be directly interpreted as the semi-elasticity of investment with respect
to that tax rate.
Thus, the level of foreign taxation is observed through the only available measure of tax
rates in emerging countries : the statutory tax rate. These data come from the Corporate and
Individual Taxes 1999-2000 Worldwide Summaries of PricewaterhouseCoopers. This database
has the advantage to cover a large amount of emerging countries and to give the profit tax
rates applicable to foreign companies, contrary to the World Tax Database which provides the
statutory tax rate applicable on domestic companies only. The correlation between the statutory
tax rate of the World Tax Database and the statutory tax rate of PricewaterhouseCoopers is
0.87, indicating that both measures are close to each other but that different rates can apply
on domestic and foreign companies.
Country-level characteristics are considered through usual determinants such as the GDP,
the GDP per capita, the distance between Japan and the emerging country, the ICRG composite
risk index, the agglomeration forces and the availability of infrastructure. According to Wheeler
and Mody (1992) and Mody and Srinivasan (1998), these variables are major determinants of
FDI in emerging countries. Following Head et al. (1995) who consider that Japanese firms tend
to locate near other Japanese firms, the measure of agglomeration is the number of Japanese
affiliates located in a country “i”. The availability of infrastructure is measured by the per-
income stock of telephone lines. This variable as the advantage to be available for numerous
emerging countries and to be correlated with different kinds of infrastructure (Easterly and
Levine, 1997; Collier and Gunning, 1999). Finally, we consider parent firm specific effects with
a measure of the capital stock. The vector of explanatory variables used for the econometric
estimation is presented in the Appendix.
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4.2 Empirical Results
Table 2 reports ordinary least square estimates of the determinants of Japanese investments in
emerging countries in 2001. Most of the coefficients have the expected sign and are significant
across the estimations. As suggested by Schneider and Frey (1985) or Wheeler and Mody (1992),
the market size, proxied by the level of GDP, appears to be an important determinant of the
capital invested in emerging countries. The effect of GDP per capita is more controversial as this
variable can proxy the host country’s development level but also labour costs9. The empirical
specification suggests that Japanese investments are deterred by a high level of GDP per capita.
They are also discouraged by the distance between Japan and the host country, as distance can
increase transaction costs such as information costs and cultural differences. The amount of
capital invested is positively influenced by the number of Japanese firms. This correspond to
the assumption that Japanese firms prefer to invest close to other Japanese firms in order to
benefit from agglomeration spill-overs. The stock of capital of the parent firm positively affects
the amount of capital invested in the affiliate, implying that large firms are more able to invest
abroad. The per-income stock of telephone lines and the ICRG composite risk variables are not
significant in these specifications.
Of particular interest, the statutory tax rate variable is statistically significant and has the
expected sign. A 1% point increase in the statutory tax rate generates a 5.3% decrease of the
capital invested abroad. Thus without distinguishing investment by the mode of establishment
or by the intensity in R&D, there is support for a link between the level of foreign taxation and
the amount of Japanese capital invested in emerging countries10.
First, in order to investigate the assumption that the capital invested in wholly-owned
ventures should be more sensitive to the level of taxes than the capital invested in joint-ventures,
we measure and compare the sensitivity of the capital invested in both kinds of ventures to the
level of foreign taxes. To fulfill, the equation in Column 2 is changed by disentangling joint-
ventures from wholly-owned ventures through a multiplicative dummy. Without controlling
for tax sparing agreements, the results suggest that the capital invested in joint-ventures and
wholly-owned ventures reacts differently to the level of the statutory tax rate. When the effect
9As wages and GDP per capita can be strongly correlated, GDP per capita can also control for labour costs.
A correlation about 0.7 between GDP per capita and the labour costs per worker in manufacturing coming from
Rama and Artecona (2002) tends to reinforce this hypothesis.
10If it is well established that the level of taxes deter FDI in developed countries, this relationship is not
obvious dealing with emerging countries. Indeed, very few studies focus on the effects of taxes on FDI in
these type of countries and the determinants of FDI are considered to vary systematically with the level of
development (Wheeler and Mody, 1992; Blonigen and Wang, 2005).
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of taxation on capital is distinguished by mode of entry, the coefficient is 20% bigger for wholly-
owned ventures.
However, because the effects of tax sparing provisions are not considered in this estimation,
it is difficult to conclude that the capital invested in joint-ventures and wholly-owned ventures
has a different sensitivity to the level of foreign taxation. First, when a tax sparing provision is
in force in an emerging country, investors can fully benefit from fiscal incentives granted by the
host country. Taxation deferral and transfer pricing abuses are not the only ways to preserve
low corporate tax benefits. This additional factor has to be considered. Furthermore, under
tax sparing, the direct relationship between the statutory tax rate and the amount of capital
invested in the host country is not obvious. The characteristics of the tax sparing provision
seems to suggest that multinationals have to realized a trade-off between high statutory tax
rate and low statutory tax rate locations among tax sparing countries. Indeed, on the one hand
the high tax rate would generate a larger fictitious tax credit to the home country which will
reduce the fiscal burden owed in Japan. On the other hand, as tax incentives and exemptions
are generally limited to a pre-determined number of years, Japanese multinationals may prefer
to invest in low tax countries in order to not be penalized at the end of the fiscal grant. To
summarize, if the statutory tax rate represents a meaningful measure of taxes11 when analyzing
the impact of taxes on the amount of capital invested in no tax sparing countries, the meaningful
measure of taxes in tax sparing countries would be the difference between the statutory tax
rate and the effective tax rate12. However, the distinction between tax sparing countries and
no tax sparing countries allows two interesting investigations. On the one hand, focusing on
no TS countries allows us to analyze how the sensitivity of investment to taxes depends on
the ownership mode of affiliates more rigorously, without being biased by the existence of the
provision. On the other hand, this distinction allows us to compare the sensitivity of capital
investment to taxes according to the ownership mode between both kinds of countries.
In Column 3, we separately investigate the sensitivity of Japanese capital invested in joint-
ventures and wholly-owned ventures to foreign taxation in tax sparing and no tax sparing
11Compare to effective tax rates, the statutory tax rate has the disadvantage to not reflect tax incentives
and accelerated depreciation. However, contrary to more complex measure of taxes, it has the advantage to be
easily taken into account by foreign investors.
12Indeed, as explained in the previous section, under tax sparing the investor can benefit from fiscal grants
as he can claim to the home country a foreign tax credit for the taxes that have been “spared”, i.e not actually
paid in the host country. That means that if the host country statutory tax rate is 20% and that the fiscal grant
offered by the host country allows the investor to pay only a 10% tax rate, the benefit for the investor will be
the difference between 20% (the foreign tax credit) and 10% (the effective tax rate).
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Table 2: Japanese Capital Responsiveness to Taxes: Joint venture versus wholly-owned ventures
Dependent variable: ln Capital Investment
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ln GDP 0.243a 0.247a 0.212a 0.190a 0.191a 0.178a
(0.061) (0.061) (0.068) (0.058) (0.057) (0.063)
ln GDP per capita −0.375a −0.351a −0.357a -0.212 -0.216 -0.245
(0.120) (0.119) (0.127) (0.187) (0.186) (0.241)
ln distance −0.465a −0.445a −0.385a −0.307a −0.303a −0.274a
(0.079) (0.078) (0.084) (0.075) (0.075) (0.079)
ln agglomeration 0.261a 0.245a 0.219a 0.140a 0.137a 0.149b
(0.053) (0.052) (0.065) (0.049) (0.049) (0.063)
ln total capital 0.335a 0.338a 0.336a 0.349a 0.349a 0.347a
(0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021)
ln tel line per income −0.278 −0.236 −0.080 −0.087 −0.078 −0.018
(0.185) (0.185) (0.226) (0.174) (0.174) (0.208)
ln ICRG 0.539 0.551 0.464 0.930 0.932 0.734
(0.695) (0.691) (0.700) (0.656) (0.656) (0.667)
STR −5.266a −4.295a
(1.103) (1.048)
JV*STR −4.692a −4.165a
(1.103) (1.049)
WO*STR −5.593a −4.382a
(1.092) (1.053)
JV*TS*STR −3.655a −3.747a
(1.281) (1.195)
WO*TS*STR −4.321a −3.761a
(1.283) (1.199)
JV*noTS*STR −3.425b −2.878b
(1.368) (1.261)
WO*noTS*STR −6.133a −4.679a
(1.140) (1.118)
Sector fixed effects:
Manufacture 1.813a 1.819a 1.820a
(0.185) (0.185) (0.186)
Transport −0.015 −0.011 −0.007
(0.248) (0.247) (0.249)
Wholesale 0.024 0.044 0.053
(0.199) (0.201) (0.203)
Retail 1.328a 1.338a 1.345a
(0.302) (0.301) (0.305)
Finance 1.123a 1.133a 1.140a
(0.319) (0.320) (0.320)
Service −0.214 −0.200 −0.205
(0.246) (0.246) (0.246)
Constant 5.810 5.738 8.153 5.373 5.373 6.017
(5.046) (5.008) (5.421) (3.771) (3.771) (3.875)
Observations 3774 3774 3774 3774 3774 3774
R-squared 0.16 0.17 0.17 0.30 0.30 0.30
Notes: The letters “a”, “b” and “c” indicate respectively a significance level of 1, 5 and 10
percent. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. STR stands for statutory tax rate, JV
for joint-ventures, WO for wholly-owned ventures, TS for tax sparing and noTS for no tax
sparing. 18
countries. In no tax sparing countries the coefficient of wholly-owned ventures is 1.8 time
higher than the coefficient of joint-ventures. This difference, which is statistically significant, is
also predicted by Desai et al. (2004). Their analysis covers developed and developing countries,
but as the United-States does not sign tax sparing provisions with developing countries, a
comparison between their results and ours in that case is possible. Thus in line with the
literature, our results suggest that, in no tax sparing emerging countries, the amount of capital
invested in wholly-owned ventures is strongly negatively influenced by the level of taxes as a 1%
point increase of the statutory tax rate generates a 6% decrease of the Japanese capital invested
abroad. The capital invested in joint-ventures is less sensitive to tax rates in no tax sparing
countries as capital decreases by 3.4% in response to a 1% point increase in the statutory tax
rate.
In the presence of a tax sparing provision, the literature does not necessarily predict a
difference in the capital sensitivity to taxes when it is invested in wholly-owned or joint-ventures
affiliates. In this situation, two factors, tax deferral and tax sparing, can preserve tax benefits
in the same way for both modes of establishment. Even if wholly-owned affiliates are still more
able to benefit from transfer pricing, with this additional factor the capital sensitivity to taxes
depending on the mode of establishment should diminish compared to the situation prevailing
in no tax sparing countries. Our results indicate that a 1% point increase in the statutory tax
rate decreases the capital invested in wholly-owned ventures by 4.3% and the capital invested
in joint-ventures by 3.7%. Thus the magnitude of the coefficients indicates that the impact of
taxes is 18% higher for the capital invested in wholly-owned affiliates in tax sparing countries
and 79% higher for the capital invested in wholly-owned affiliates in no tax sparing countries.
As conditions for attracting FDI may vary by sectors, we add sectoral control dummies in
Column 4, 5 and 6. Seven sectors are considered: agriculture, wholesale, retail trade, manufac-
ture, service, transport and finance. Controlling for sector fixed effects also allow us to test the
robustness13 of previous results. We can see from the three last columns that the magnitude
of the tax coefficients diminishes slightly, but that the difference of capital sensitivity observed
between wholly owned ventures and joint ventures is conserved when sectoral dummies are
13The robustness of the results is also tested by checking for multicollinearity and by checking for model
specification error. The results of these tests indicate first that the variables used in the model are not redundant
as no variables can be considered as a linear combination of other independent variables. Furthermore, the
interaction terms between the statutory tax rate, the ownership mode and the tax sparing situation of a country
do not generate multicollinearity in the model. This can also be checked by the stability of the standard errors
across estimations (there are not inflated when interaction terms are added). Second, tests detecting specification
errors indicate that no relevant variables have been omitted from the model.
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included.
We next consider whether the capital invested in affiliates with higher R&D expenditures is
more sensitive to the level of corporate tax rates than low R&D affiliates. As discussed above,
the paper of Chan and Chow (1997) found evidence that high-technology firms, which are
more able to manipulate transfer pricing (Lall, 1979), are not audited by authorities in China
to avoid the risk of losing them to other countries. Thus, we predict that the effect of the
statutory tax rate on Japanese capital investment should be stronger for high R&D affiliates.
Following Blonigen (1997), affiliates are considered to be high R&D affiliates if the R&D as a
percentage of sales of its parent is above average. All other affiliates are considered to be low
R&D affiliates. In Column 1 of Table 3, we first simply investigate the sensitivity of Japanese
capital to foreign corporate tax rates by distinguishing high R&D affiliates from low R&D
affiliates. Without controlling for tax sparing provisions, we obtain a statistically significant
greater semi-elasticity between Japanese capital and taxes for R&D intensive firms. Column 2
presents the estimates considering separately high R&D joint-ventures, low R&D joint-ventures,
high R&D wholly-owned ventures and low R&D wholly-owned ventures, which are also dummy
variables interacted with the statutory tax rate. The results indicate that the capital of high
R&D joint-ventures and wholly-owned ventures is more reactive to the level of statutory tax
rate compared to low R&D affiliates. The coefficient estimated for wholly-owned affiliates is
33% higher for high R&D affiliates than the coefficient for low R&D affiliates. Dealing with
joint-ventures, the coefficient estimated is 16% higher for high R&D affiliates compared to low
R&D affiliates. The difference between the magnitude of the coefficients of high R&D and low
R&D affiliates is statistically significant.
In addition to this test, we next run a similar equation by distinguishing the impact of taxes
on the capital invested in high R&D and low R&D affiliates in tax sparing and no tax sparing
countries. Firstly, Column 2 of Table 3 shows that there is evidence that the capital invested
in high R&D joint-ventures and high R&D wholly-owned ventures is more deterred by foreign
taxes compared to low R&D affiliates in both tax sparing and no tax sparing countries. In no
tax sparing countries the capital invested in wholly-owned affiliates is twice more responsive
to the level of taxes when the affiliate is intensive in R&D. If the amount of capital invested
in joint-ventures is strongly influenced by taxes when the affiliate is a high R&D one, the
coefficient is not significant for low R&D affiliates. In tax sparing countries the magnitude of
these differences is less important with 23% between high and low R&D wholly-owned affiliates
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Table 3: Japanese Capital Responsiveness to Taxes: High-R&D versus low-R&D affiliates
Dependent variable: ln Capital Investment
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
ln GDP 0.240a 0.242a 0.200a 0.186a 0.186a 0.164a
(0.061) (0.060) (0.067) (0.057) (0.057) (0.062)
ln GDP per capita −0.367a −0.340a −0.322b −0.233 −0.237 −0.296
(0.119) (0.119) (0.127) (0.185) (0.185) (0.237)
ln distance −0.460a −0.442a −0.362a −0.303a −0.300a −0.246a
(0.079) (0.078) (0.084) (0.075) (0.075) (0.078)
ln agglomeration 0.258a 0.242a 0.221a 0.138a 0.136a 0.153b
(0.052) (0.052) (0.064) (0.049) (0.049) (0.063)
ln total capital 0.365a 0.367a 0.362a 0.376a 0.377a 0.371a
(0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023)
ln tel line per income −0.249 −0.201 0.005 −0.062 −0.054 0.066
(0.184) (0.183) (0.224) (0.173) (0.172) (0.204)
ln ICRG 0.487 0.491 0.217 0.885 0.887 0.465
(0.692) (0.689) (0.701) (0.653) (0.653) (0.665)
STR*highR&D −5.841a −4.860a
(1.108) (1.050)
STR*lowR&D −4.787a −3.857a
(1.098) (1.043)
JV*STR*highR&D −4.961a −4.733a
(1.110) (1.058)
JV*STR*lowR&D −4.310a −3.743a
(1.096) (1.044)
WO*STR*highR&D −6.497a −4.945a
(1.120) (1.081)
WO*STR*lowR&D −4.887a −3.933a
(1.085) (1.051)
WO*STR*lowR&D*noTS −3.941a −2.502b
(1.259) (1.248)
WO*STR*lowR&D*TS −3.357a −2.979b
(1.289) (1.198)
WO*STR*highR&D*noTS −8.244a −6.707a
(1.329) (1.275)
WO*STR*highR&D*TS −4.241a −3.145b
(1.318) (1.225)
JV*STR*lowR&D*noTS -1.255 -0.374
(1.465) (1.325)
JV*STR*lowR&D*TS −2.862b −2.826b
(1.284) (1.191)
JV*STR*highR&D*noTS −5.604a −5.478a
(1.631) (1.492)
JV*STR*highR&D*TS −3.188b −3.456a
(1.306) (1.210)
Sector fixed effects:
Manufacture 1.850a 1.854a 1.864a
(0.184) (0.184) (0.183)
Transport −0.007 −0.004 −0.002
(0.247) (0.246) (0.244)
Wholesale 0.085 0.103 0.115
(0.198) (0.200) (0.198)
Retail 1.328a 1.337a 1.379a
(0.297) (0.297) (0.298)
Finance 1.149a 1.158a 1.172a
(0.315) (0.315) (0.313)
Service −0.184 −0.171 −0.204
(0.247) (0.247) (0.244)
Constant 5.948 5.995 9.416c 5.332 5.266 6.789c
(5.024) (4.984) (5.353) (3.759) (3.748) (3.817)
Observations 3774 3774 3774 3774 3774 3774
R-squared 0.17 0.17 0.18 0.30 0.30 0.31
Notes: The letters “a”, “b” and “c” indicate respectively a significance level of 1, 5 and 10 percent. Robust
standard errors are in parentheses.
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and 12% between high and low R&D joint-ventures, but this last difference is not statistically
significant. Secondly, the capital of wholly-owned affiliates is more sensitive to the level of
foreign taxation compared to joint-ventures affiliates in no tax sparing countries. This difference
is noticeable for both high R&D and low R&D affiliates. A 1% point increase of the statutory
tax rate engenders a decrease of 8.2% of the capital invested in high R&D wholly-owned and
a decrease of 5.6% of the capital invested in high R&D joint-ventures. This difference is even
more striking for low R&D affiliates as a 1% point increase of the statutory tax rate generates
a decrease of 3.4% of the capital invested in wholly-owned affiliates and has a non-significant
impact on the Japanese capital invested in joint-ventures.
In column 4, 5 and 6 sectoral control dummies are included. As in Table 2, these control
variables slightly diminish the magnitude of the tax variable coefficients, however, the differences
observed among the tax interaction term coefficients are maintained when considering sector
fixed effects.
These findings have an interesting implication. Japanese investors seem to take advantage
of tax planning opportunities as we can observe a strongly and significant relationship between
tax rates and the amount of capital invested in emerging countries. In the same way, Swenson
(2001) finds that Japanese investments in the U.S between 1984 and 1994 are strongly deterred
by the level of taxes as the probability to invest in U.S is negatively correlated with the level
of taxes; the elasticity is between 3.27 to 6.24, depending on the estimations. As Swenson
underlined, the level of foreign taxation should not display such a strong effect on the activity
of Japanese investors as the Japanese tax system should neutralize the attractiveness of low
tax states or countries. Furthermore, if we consider that the ability to manipulate transfer
pricing is the only characteristic that distinguishes joint-ventures from wholly-owned ventures
and high R&D affiliates from low R&D affiliates in their behavioral response to taxes, the
diverging sensitivity to the level of taxes can be interpreted as tax manipulations to diminish
the total amount of tax abilities. The literature predicts that wholly-owned ventures and high
R&D affiliates are more able to realize transfer pricing. Our results indirectly support these
assumptions as the capital invested in these types of affiliates strongly react to the level of
taxes. The only kind of affiliates which are not responsive to the level of taxes, as normally
expected absent tax planning opportunities, are the low R&D joint-ventures, operating in no
tax sparing countries, which are considered to be the less likely to manipulate transfer pricing.
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5 Conclusion
To achieve a variety of economic policy objectives, tax systems are used by governments. In
addition to finance government expenses and to provide some redistribution of income, taxation
can be used to attract foreign capital through a competitive corporate tax rate and advantageous
fiscal incentives. Considering the case of investors coming from a tax credit country - which is
supposed to neutralized the influence of low foreign tax rates - the effect of international taxation
on capital invested abroad is not obvious. Analyzing three factors that can restore the influence
of foreign tax incentives on the location of capital: tax deferral, transfer pricing and tax sparing
provisions, this paper attempts to shed light on the tax planning strategies of multinational
enterprises. Specifically, a theoretical framework highlights that firms which are more likely to
manipulate transfer pricing, such as wholly-owned ventures and high R&D affiliates, should be
more sensitive to the level of foreign taxes when investing in no tax sparing countries. Under
tax sparing provisions, the differences between the sensitivity of capital to taxes depending on
the mode of establishment or on the R&D should be less important, as the provision allows for
a direct preservation of tax benefits for all affiliates. Using Japanese foreign investment data
for 2001, our empirical analysis shows as expected a stronger relationship between statutory
tax rates and the Japanese capital invested in wholly-owned affiliates and high R&D affiliates
compared to joint-ventures and low R&D affiliates. In tax sparing countries the capital invested
in different kinds of affiliates reacts in approximately the same way to the level of corporate
tax rate. These results support the claim that in order to assess the effects of taxation on
the behavior of multinationals, it is not only necessary to consider host and home country tax
systems in interaction, but also to look beyond the tax planning opportunities associated with
the investors’ strategies to maximize after-tax rate of returns.
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6 Appendix
6.1 Data Appendix
Market size (GDP): The gross domestic product is measured at market price in current US
dollars. These data are from the ”Global Development Network Growth Database” published
by the World Bank.
GDP per capita: These data are from the “Global Development Network Growth Database”
published by the World Bank.
Distance: The distance data, between the host country and Japan, are from the CEPII.
Telephone lines/GDP: According to Easterly and Levine (1997) and Collier and Gunning
(1999), while telecommunications is the only infrastructure variable widely available for emerg-
ing countries, it is likely that different kinds of infrastructure are highly correlated. However,
the variation in stock of telecommunications can be explained by GDP per capita (Forestier et
al., 2002), thus Fink and Kenny (2003) propose to measure infrastructure by the per-income
stock of telephone lines in order to avoid correlations with market related variables. These data
are from the “Global Development Network Growth Database” published by the World Bank.
Agglomeration: The measure of agglomeration is the number of Japanese affiliates located
in a country “i”. These data are from the edition 2001 of the Toyo keizai database.
ICRG: The International Country Guide Risk publishes a composite risk rating of economic,
financial and political risks. Maximum rating are 100 and minimum rating are 0. A higher
score indicates a lower risk.
Total capital: The total capital is the stock of capital of the parent company. These data
are from the edition 2001 of the Toyo keizai database.
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